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INTRODUCTION
This Court issued its Opinion in this matter on November 21,
1994•

The Court determined that Defendant/Appellant (hereafter

"Gurley") filed a timely Notice of Appeal and vacated the trial
court's judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellee
(hereafter "Nielson") had failed to file timely notices of claim
with appropriate governmental entities, thereby depriving the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Nielson filed a Petition For Rehearing on December 12, 1994.
The Court of Appeals requested by letter of December 20, 1994
that Gurley respond only to the first three of four issues raised
by Nielson's Petition.

As set forth in Nielson's Petition, these

issues are:
1.

Portions of the record not transmitted
to this Court establish that Notice of
Claim was mailed to the Attorney General
on August 14, 1991, thus complying with
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

2.

Provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act "excepting" claims against
a state employee based on fraud or
malice from its provisions were
overlooked.

3.

Utah law exempting equitable claims from
the requirement of Notice of Claim
pursuant to the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act was overlooked or
misapprehended.

Petition, p. iii.
In the following Response Gurley addresses each of these
three issues.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complete statement of the facts as they relate to this
case generally and as they relate to the specific issue of
Nielson,s failure to file a notice of claim pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act is set forth in the Brief of Appellant,
pp. 8-12.

However, a review of the critical dates is

appropriate:
1.

On September 8, 1990, Gurley, a peace officer employed

by the Division of Wildlife Resources, disabled and seized a
portion of a device used to trap birds.

(Trial Exhibit 14; R.

215-216; Appellant's Addendum at 516-519)
2.

On September 18, 1990, Nielson, a licensed Utah

attorney representing himself, filed legal action in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, civil number
90-030-0302 (hereafter "First Action").

The First Action named

Gurley as the sole defendant and sought money damages for
"conversion"f "interference with contract" and "defamation".
(Complaint, R. 22; Appellant's Addendum at 453)
3.

Prior to filing the First Action, Nielson did not file

a Notice of Claim with the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
and/or with the Utah Attorney General7s Office as required by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
4.

On August 14, 1991, Nielson filed a Motion for Leave to

File Amended Complaint, together with a proposed Amended
Complaint in the First Action.

This proposed Amended Complaint
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was served by mail on John A. Soltis# Esq., who, at the time, was
counsel of record for Gurley.
5.

The proposed Amended Complaint, together with its

August 14, 1991 certificate of mailing, were included in the
original Record before this Court (R. 329-341) and in the
Appellants Addendum at 427-439.

It is the service-by mail on

Mr. Soltis of the proposed Amended Complaint which appellee now
claims constitutes notice to the Attorney General of the State of
Utah of Nielson's intent to file another lawsuit.
6.

On September 9, 1991, plaintiff filed a second legal

action in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele
County, civil number 91-030-0249 (R. 2087; hereafter "Second
Action").

The Complaint in the Second Action is virtually

identical to the Amended Complaint which Nielson sought leave to
file in the First Action.
7.

On December 30, 1991, plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint in the Second Action.

(R. 2214)

ARGUMENT
I.
NIELSON DID NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH PRIOR
TO INITIATING LEGAL ACTION AGAINST GURLEY
Nielson argues that this Court should entertain a rehearing
on the notice of claim issue because the record on appeal did not
include the mailing certificate that he claims to prove service

of a "notice of claim" on the Attorney General. A copy of
Nielson's letter to the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and
-*

the mailing certificate which he refers to in this letter are
attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

Not surprisingly, Nielson never

indicates what the mailing certificate is attached to.

In fact,

it is the certificate of service of the proposed Amended
Complaint, which Nielson filed in the First Action and which was
served on John Soltis in his capacity as counsel of record for
Gurley in the First Action.

Clearly, it was not intended to be

and cannot legally constitute a notice of claim under the
Governmental Immunity Act filed with the Attorney General.
Moreover, Nielson's representation that the mailing
certificate was not a part of the record on appeal is false.

The

proposed Amended Complaint was part of the initial record of
appeal and can be found at 329-341, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 2. Additionally, the proposed Amended
Complaint was part of the Appellant's Addendum submitted to this
Court with the Brief of Appellant (Appellant's Addendum at 427439).

Thus, Nielson's argument that the Court failed to consider

evidence because the record was not before it is patently
wrong. ~;
Nielson admits that he did not file a notice of claim prior
to initiating his First Action on September 18, 1990. As this
Court has already ruled, the failure of Nielson to precede the
^Apparently, the district court clerk had Bates stamped, but
not forwarded, the pleadings in the Second Action to the Court of
Appeals. However, although the proposed Amended Complaint was
attached as an exhibit to Nielson's Complaint filed in the Second
Action, it was also, obviously, part of the record in the First
Action, which was available to the Court at the time it decided
the appeal.
- 4 -
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-yEven if the service of the Amended Complaint could have the
legal effect that Nielson argues it should, the Court:, would, sti 11
lack subject matter jurisdiction because Nielson's Second Action
was commenced on September 9, 1991 when he filed it with the
Third District Court. Rule 3(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. H e failed to allow ninety days from service of the
proposed Amended Complaint in the First Action on August 14, 1991
before instituting the Second Action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14
provides that a governmental entity has ninety days to act upon a
notice of claim. If the governmental entity fails to respond to
the claimant within the ninety days, the claim is deemed denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 clearly states that a claimant may
institute an action in the district court against a governmen
entity or an employee of the entity only w i f the claim is
denied". Thus, even under Nielson's tortured scenario, his
Second Action was instituted prematurely, once again depriving
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.

i

the Attorney General of the State of Utah as required by
S 63-30-12, which requires that a claim against the State of Utah
or one of its employees be "filed with the Attorney General and
the agency concerned".

The only place that the proposed Amended

Complaint was filed was with the Third District Court.

The only

other place it was delivered or directed was to Gurley's lawyer.
It was never directed or delivered as a notice of claim to the
Attorney General.
Nielson's attempt to bootstrap a pleading entitled "Amended
Complaint" and served on counsel of record in the First Action
into a formal notice of claim served upon the Attorney General of
the State of Utah is absurd.

Mr. Soltis, a lawyer employed by

the Utah Attorney General, was representing Gurley in the First
Action because the conduct which Nielson assailed was performed
by Gurley in his capacity as a peace officer for the State of
Utah.

Neither the State of Utah nor the Attorney General were

parties to the legal action and Mr. Soltis could not, by
definition, have been representing either of them in the lawsuit.
He was operating solely as the attorney for Gurley in defending
Nielson's legal action against him.
Additionally, nowhere does Nielson attempt to, nor can he,
explain what the proposed Amended Complaint purports to be notice
of.

Nowhere in the proposed Amended Complaint does Nielson state

that he intends to file another separate lawsuit to mimic the
allegations set forth in the proposed Amended Complaint.

The

only thing the proposed Amended Complaint is notice of is that
- 6 -
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notice requirements.

Apparently, his argument is that by

amending the Complaint in the Second Action in December 1991 to
add a prayer for injunctive relief, he turned the case into an
action in equity and thereby removed the entire consolidated
lawsuit from the purview of the Governmental Immunity Act.

The

folly of Nielson's argument is apparent.
In support of his argument, Nielson cites only American
Tierra

Corp.

In American

v.

City

Tierra,

of West

Jordan,

840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992).

the Utah Supreme Court recognized only that

claims for the recovery of taxes or unlawful levies are equitable
in nature and, consequently, not subject to the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act.

The case is

inapposite because the present lawsuit is plainly not equitable
in nature.

In fact, the original Complaint filed by Nielson on

September 18, 1990 in the First Action set forth only tort claims
for

,f

conversionff, "tortious interference with contract" and

"defamation."

(R. 0022)

His prayer for relief requested only

money damages. Id.
On August 14, 1991, after the Court granted his Motion For
Summary Judgment, Nielson moved to amend his Complaint in the
First Action.

Along with his Motion To Amend, he filed his

proposed Amended Complaint, which again set forth claims for
conversion, tortious interference with contract, and defamation
and prayed for money damages.

(R. 0341)

Nielson added a prayer

for injunctive relief, essentially requesting that the Court
order Gurley not to engage in tortious conduct in the future.
- 8 -

Id.

Nielson's Amended Complaint in the Second Action is

identical in its claims and prayer for relief.

(R. 2230)

Nielson's three tort claims, whether in the First Action or the
Second Action, are clearly not equitable in nature.

The fact

that he added an incidental prayer for "injunctive relief" based
on those claims does not change the fundamental nature of the
lawsuit and cannot magically cure its preexisting jurisdictional
defects.

See El Rancho Enterprises,

Inc.

v. Murray City,

565

P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977).
If one were to accept Nielson's argument, plaintiffs could
in every instance circumvent the Governmental Immunity Act by
simply adding a prayer for "injunctive relief" even where, as
here, all the causes of action are common law tort claims for
money damages.

The Act would be meaningless.

Clearly, such a

result is not intended by our legislature or courts.
This lawsuit is plainly legal in nature. Nielson's argument
that equitable claims are not subject to the notice requirements
of the Governmental Immunity Act is without merit and does not
warrant rehearing of the appeal. Moreover, this argument is not
new.

Nielson made the same argument before and this Court

properly rejected it.
III.
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED
NIELSON'S ARGUMENT THAT ALLEGATIONS OF MALICE
EXEMPT HIS CLAIMS FROM THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
This issue has already been thoroughly briefed and correctly
ruled upon by this Court.

Unhappy with the result, Nielson
-

Q

-

continues to assert his unsuccessful argument that the scope of
the notice requirement is co-extensive with the substantive
sovereign immunity provision of the Act.
Nielson, once again, confuses the provision of the
Governmental Immunity Act that provides for personal liability of
an employee who acts with fraud or malice (§ 63-30-4(3)) with
separate provisions of the Act requiring delivery of notices of
claim.

This Court correctly holds that the issues of immunity

from personal liability and the requirement for filing a notice
of claim under the Act are not co-extensive.
p. 9.

See Slip Opinion,

This Court's holding on this issue is clearly correct and

there is no reason to revisit it.
In Madsen v. Borthick,
1988)(Borthick II),

769 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah

the Utah Supreme Court discussed the very

statutory language in effect at the time Nielson commenced this
action and noted that the language expressly required "service of
notice of claim on the State in all suits against employees,
whether or not any judgment might be ultimately payable by the
State".

769 P.2d at 252 and n. 11. The determining factors for

the notice requirement are not whether malice or fraud are
alleged, but whether the underlying acts were "under color of
authority."

This Court has properly recognized that Borthick

II

disposes of Nielson7s malice argument in Gurley's favor.
Furthermore, as Gurley explained in his Reply Brief,
Yearsely

v. Jensen,

798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990), implicitly

recognizes that allegations of malice do not suffice to
- 10 -

circumvent the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity
Act.

There a plaintiff was not permitted to add claims based on

malice where she had failed previously to provide prior, proper
notice of her initial claims,
Nielson's repeated citation to cases for the proposition
that immunity is waived for claims of fraud or malice can only be
designed to mislead the Court.

As the Court properly recognized,

the scope of the notice requirement is distinct and broader than
the scope of governmental immunity.

This is the only

interpretation of the Act which makes sense and the only
interpretation supported by the case law.

Nielson has failed to

cite a single case in which notice was not required because
claims against a government employee were based on malice or
fraud.

The Court's ruling on this issue is correct and should

not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
Nielson's argument that portions of the record were not
transmitted and therefore prevented this Court from considering
his mailing certificate is inaccurate.

The certificate of

mailing that Nielson proposes to constitute service of a notice
of claim on the Attorney General was a part of the record
transmitted to this Court and available at the time it considered
the merits of the appeal. Moreover, the record clearly
establishes that the pleading to which the mailing certificate
was attached was not and cannot constitute a notice of claim
delivered to the Attorney General.
- 11 -

It was attached to a proposed

Amended Complaint filed in the First Action and was simply served
on Gurley's counsel of record.

It was never intended as a notice

of claim; neither could it be considered a notice of claim
regardless of its intent.

Moreover, it was never "delivered11 to

the Attorney General of the State of Utah.
Nielson's argument that notice was not required because his
claims are equitable in nature is one that has already been
argued and dismissed by this Court.

Furthermore, the record

establishes that Nielson's claims are not equitable in nature.
They are and always have been legal claims arising out of alleged
common law torts.
Similarly, Nielson's final argument that he need only allege
malice and fraud to avoid the notice requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act has appropriately been rejected by this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court.
Nielson's desperate arguments all attempt to circumvent the
clear meaning and legislative intent of the notice of claim
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

One must

presume that Nielson, himself an attorney, made a calculated
decision not to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Indeed, the theme of his appellate arguments has been that he
doesn't have to comply because Gurley was outside the scope of
his employment as a peace officer.

The holding of this Court

that Gurley was acting under color of authority and that proper
notices of claim had to be filed at least ninety days before
instituting legal action is correct and cannot be assailed.
- 12 -

Because he was acting under color of authority, Nielson was
required to comply with the notice of claim provisions of the
Act.

He did not.

Nielson7s Petition for Rehearing must be

denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 1995.
,IAMS & HUNT

By
DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January, 1995, I
caused a true and correct copy of ANSWER OF APPELLANT TO
APPELLEES PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
S a l t Lake C i t y , UtcrfT\ 84111

j
By
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XAAA .
DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Appellant

A

EXHIBIT 1

Parker M. Nielson

Attorney at Law (P.C.)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-1150

December 8, 1994

Marilyn N. Branch, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

Nielson v. Gurley, No. 930327-CA

Dear Ms. Branch:
When we went to your office to check the record in the
above-entitled case, with reference to Judge Orme's opinion
indicating that there was no evidence in the record of our having
filed a notice with the Attorney General, we found that you did
not have the entire record. This matter involves two
consolidated appeals; case no. 910300249 with no. 900300302. The
record on file includes only the portion relating to the 3 02 case
and does not contain the record concerning the 249 case.
We subsequently checked with the Clerk of the Court in Tooele
and discovered that the record concerning the 249 case is still
lodged with the District Court. It is properly paginated and
indexed for transmission to the Court of Appeals, but for some
unknown reason has never been transmitted. The proof of service
that Judge Orme was unable to find appears at Record p. 2202 of
the 249 file.
I have suggested that the Clerk of the Court in Tooele
transmit the record to you. If there is any need to do so, you
should also request that portion of the record so that it will be
available when we file our Petition for Rehearing.
Your cooperation in this regard is appreciated.
Very truly yours,

barker M. Nielson
PMN:lh(0668N)
cc: Clerk of the Court, Tooele
Dennis Ferguson, Esq.
Jody K. Burnett, Esq.

to Plaintiff's character and reputations'

For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount

for attorneys' fees; and
F.

For such further and additional relief as the Court

determines proper.
DATED this/2^1 day of August, 1991.

/Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this *'-_ ''day of August, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the above and foreqoing AMENDED COMPLAINT
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. John P. Soltis, Assistant
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114.
/

(0289N)

^02202
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EXHIBIT 2

3RD DISTRICT COURT-TDQELE

PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

9! AUG 15 ?n 2^ 33
FILED BY

SL

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
i
i

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Jury Demanded)

]
Judge Richard H. Moffat

DALE GURLEY,
Civil No. 900 300 302
Defendant.

]

Leave of the Court being first had and obtained, Plaintiff
complains of Defendant and alleges as follows (Exhibits, other
than the letter referred to in paragraph 30, are omitted to avoid
redundancy, as to which see the Verified Complaint herein):
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant is a resident of Payson, Utah County, State of

Utah.
3.

The incidents complained of occurred in Tooele County,

State of Utah, and involve a sum or value in excess of $10,000.
PERTINENT FACTS
4.

Plaintiff has property rights, in common with Messrs.

Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, by virtue of Special Use Lease
Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, Division of State Lands
and Forestry, in the following lands situated in Tooele County,

State of Utah:
Township
Section
Section
Section

9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Said lease, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by reference, is for the specific purpose of
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for hunting dog training and
conducting non-commercial competition of hunting dogs."
5.

The lessees as to said Lease No. 798, acting by and through

Leslie Foote, applied to the State of Utah, Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, for and were issued a
Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife Farm at T.9S.,
R.6W., SLB&M, Sec. 15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., which is inclusive of
the lands embraced by Lease No. 798.

Said Certificate of Registra-

tion, No. PWF-SLO-129, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B and
incorporated herein by reference, was pursuant to an application, a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by
reference, for the purpose of "dog training and incidental
propagation."
6.

The State of Utah, Division of Wildlife Resources, has

issued a "Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game Birds," a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated
herein by reference, provisions of which are controlling as to
persons, including those holding a Certificate of Registration for
a Private Wildlife Farm or otherwise possessing live game birds.
Said proclamation contains the following provisions pertinent to
this Complaint:

2

t!00^i0

(a) A "private wildlife farm" is defined as
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited to,
a pen or aviary, where privately owned game birds
are propagated or kept and which enclosure
restricts the birds from escaping into the wild,"
(Emphasis added.)
(b) "A certificate of registration IS NOT
required for a person to acquire live game birds
for the purpose of training dogs . . . provided
the birds are banded, are not held for more than
60 days, and a bill of sale from a legal source
is in possession." (Emphasis in original.)
(c) "Any peace officer or special function
officer may request persons engaged in activities
covered under these rules to exhibit any
documentation related to such activities
(including, but not limited to, certificate of
registration, permit, health certificate, bill of
sale, proof of ownership), any game birds, and
any device, apparatus and facility used for
activities covered under these rules."
7.

The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §

23-13-14, and the Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game
Birds, R608-4-3, provide that "live game birds may not be released
or abandoned without first obtaining written authorization from
the Director of the [Wildlife Resources] Division."
8.

Various provisions of The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah,

including Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2, permit, inter

alia,

persons

legally possessing live game birds to restrict them and prevent
their release or abandonment, as they are required to do by said
provisions alleged in the preceding paragraph, by "taking" or
"trapping," including by recall pens, "any birds . . . held in
private ownership legally acquired."

The process of recalling, or

trapping, birds in private ownership but which may be temporarily
out of a holding pen also constitutes the maintenance, control and
constructive possession of and over domestic game birds acquired
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from a legal source.
9.

Said proclamation for Taking of Upland Game was adopted by

the State of Utah Wildlife Board providing, in pertinent part, as
follows:
DAMAGE OF PROPERTY . . . [I]t is unlawful
for any person, without the consent of the
owner or person in charge of any privately
owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy
any . . . fence or other enclosure on this
privately owned land . . . .
Said provision is identical with Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15.
CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF
10.

On September 7, 1990, Plaintiff purchased four (4) live

Chukar Partridge from a licensed game farm in Tooele County.

A

copy of the bill of sale as to said Chukar is attached hereto as
Exhibit E.
11.

Also on September 7, 1990, Plaintiff took said Chukar to

a locked and secure pen outfitted or equipped with devices, known
as "recall cones," for maintaining possession and control over
privately owned game birds outside of, but in near proximity to,
the pen.

Said pen was on the premises leased to Plaintiff under

said Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798.

Plaintiff supplied the

Chukar with feed and water, and left them there for safekeeping.
12.

Plaintiff maintained and had in his possession at said

pen a supply of bands, furnished by and purchased from the
Division of Wildlife Resources, State of Utah, for use in banding
live game birds if and when used for dog training, in accordance
with the foregoing proclamation.
13.

In the early morning of September 8, 1990, Plaintiff went
4
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to the premises described by said Special Use Lease Agreement No.
798 and took three (3) of the live birds in the pen and used them,
immediately, for hunting dog training in accordance with said
Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game Birds. The fourth
bird was left in the pen, for the purpose of maintaining
constructive possession and control over those used for training
by means of said recall cones or devices and by taking advantage
of their natural "covey instinct."
14.

During the entire time alleged, Plaintiff had in his

possession copies of Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SL0-129
and a bill of sale documenting the purchase of four (4) live game
birds from a lawful source.
15.

After several hours of hunting dog training, and

replenishing the water in a float-fed water device near the bird
pen, Plaintiff drove near enough to a pickup truck and two men who
had been observed watching Plaintiff's activities for
approximately one-half hour to verify that they were engaged in no
mischief, and then left the leased premises at about 10:00 a.m.
CONDUCT OF DEFENDANT
16.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that one of the two men seen
observing Plaintiff from said pickup truck was Defendant, Dale
Gurley ("Gurley" herein).
17.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that Gurley had been observing the
activities of Plaintiff for a period of hours, from an oak covered
area on the ridge between North Oak Brush and North Pine Canyons,
5

a distance of about one mile southerly from said pen.

Plaintiff

is further informed and believes, and on such information and
belief alleges, that Gurley had, from time to time for a period of
weeks prior to September 8, 1990, from motor vehicles and from
vantage points where he attempted to conceal himself, observed
Plaintiff going and coming to said premises to care for domestic
game birds maintained by Plaintiff thereon and engaging in hunting
dog training.
18.

Gurley did not, at any time during the period of his

observations of Plaintiff, request Plaintiff to exhibit any
documentation, including any certificate of registration, permit,
bill of sale or proof of ownership of any game birds or any
device, apparatus and facility used or related to such activities,
although Gurley could easily have done so over a period of weeks
and was in near proximity to and within voice range of Plaintiff
for at least one-half hour.
19.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that Gurley did tear down,
mutilate or destroy the fence or other enclosure represented by
the bird pen and bird house, in disregard of Plaintiff's rights
thereto and in disregard of the laws of the State of Utah and
proclamations of the Wildlife Board alleged herein.
20.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that Gurley destroyed, or
converted to his own use, the following described personal
property of Plaintiff located in or in conjunction with said bird
pen:
6
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Approximately fifteen (15) bands for marking game
birds, two (2) game bird feeders, one bag of game
bird feed and one plastic container containing
game bird feed, two (2) game bird watering
devices, one float control for livestock watering
and related hoses and fixtures for watering
wildlife (not limited to game birds) and domestic
birds and at least one live game bird (Chukar
Partridge) together with at least six (6) other
game birds (Chukar Partridge) which were under
Plaintiffs constructive possession and control
by virtue of said game farm facilities and
equipment but which are now lost by reason of the
removal of said "call" bird.
21.

Gurley then went to the Silver Sage Store, located in

Vernon, several miles from Plaintiff's leased property, and
maintained surveillance on a camper in which Plaintiff was staying
for a period of hours, but never approached Plaintiff at any time
to request the display of any permits, bill of sale or other
evidence of the regularity of Plaintiff's possession of live game
birds or other activities of Plaintiff alleged.

During the course

of Gurley7s surveillance of Plaintiff, and in the presence of
other persons known to and personal friends, professional and
business clients, and acquaintances of Plaintiff, Gurley falsely
stated in a telephone conversation from the Silver Sage Store that
Plaintiff was engaged in violations of the law, but never
confronted Plaintiff with his charges.
22.

From time to time over a period of years prior to

September 8, 1990, commencing on or about December 30, 1986,
Gurley has made public statements to the effect that he would
interfere with and prevent Plaintiff's conduct of hunting dog
training near Vernon by causing Plaintiff to be cited, arrested or
prosecuted over matters which he, Gurley, would initiate or cause
to be initiated.
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23.

The conduct of Gurley alleged was performed with actual

malice towards Plaintiff, including for the reasons alleged in the
next preceding paragraph.
DAMAGES
24.

The personal property alleged herein to have been de-

stroyed or converted to the use of Gurley has a reasonable value of
in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00)
25.

The conduct of Gurley amounts to interference with con-

tract rights of Plaintiff, including rights under said Lease No.
798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129, which have no
commercial value but significant and unique value to Plaintiff, and
the actual amount of which is difficult to appraise, but are
believed by Plaintiff to have a fair and reasonable value of
approximately $10,000.00.
26.

The conduct of Gurley has resulted in actual damage to

Plaintiff's character and reputation, including his character as
an attorney at law, and with the Division of Wildlife Resources as
a law abiding person, in the sum or value of $50,000.00.
GROUNDS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
27.

Gurley's conduct will, unless restrained or enjoined,

result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff for which
there is no adequate remedy at law, for which money damages are
inadequate, including because Plaintiff will be prevented from
exercising the rights contracted for with the State of Utah in
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and will be prevented, both
directly and through his partner and co-lessee, Leslie Foote, from
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exercising the rights under Certificate of Registration No.
PWF-SLO-129, all of which are of unique value and which cannot be
valued or compensated for in a money judgment or a judgment at law.
28.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that Gurley has falsely stated to
employees and officers of the Forest Service of the United States
that Plaintiff is illegally trapping wild game birds and otherwise
conducting illegal activities, and such conduct will, unless
restrained or enjoined, constitute further immediate and
irreparable injury to Plaintiff as follows:
A.

Said conduct by Gurley was for the purpose or will

have the necessary effect of defaming Plaintiff and interfering
with Plaintiff's relationship with the dominant landowner in the
areas of Plaintiff's lease and raises the possibility that, unless
restrained or enjoined, Plaintiff's rights under said lease and
said Certificate of Registration will be further impaired.
B.

Said conduct of Gurley is further wrongful for the

reason that Plaintiff has enjoyed a high reputation and friendly
association with the Forest Service, including because Plaintiff
was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney having
responsibility for trial of legal disputes involving the Forest
Service.

Gurley's conduct, unless restrained or enjoined, will

result in injury to Plaintiff's reputation and association with
the Forest Service for which there is no speedy or effective
remedy at law.
C.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on

such information and belief alleges, that officers, agents and
9

employees of the Forest Service to whom Gurley has made his false
accusations include the following:

Thomas L. Tidwell, District

Ranger; Dave Griffel, Forest Officer; Ms. Marlene Depietro,
Supervisory Range Conservationist; and Jay Best, Forest Service
Contractor.
29.

The wrongfulness of Gurley's accusations regarding

Plaintiff is an adjudicated fact by virtue of the Partial Summary
Judgment entered by the Honorable David S. Young herein on June
24, 1991.
30.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that the need for injunctive
relief is evident in that Gurley has continued his unlawful
activities, in defiance and contempt of the orders of Judge Young,
including by causing the Director of the Wildlife Resources
Division, Department of Natural Resources, State of Utah, to
direct a letter dated July 8, 1991, to Plaintiff and various
associates of Plaintiff, purporting to restrict or limit dog
training activities in the area of Plaintiff's lease.

The

purpose, or one of the purposes of said letter was to impose
limits on Plaintiff's leasehold rights and dog training activities
in disregard of Judge Young's Judgment declaring such limits
improper, without probable cause and unlawful and Plaintiff is
therefore informed and believes, and on information and belief
alleges that unless restrained and enjoined Gurley and agents of
DWR, acting in concert with participation with Gurley, will
continue to disregard the orders of this Court.

A copy of said

letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
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31.

Said conduct by Gurley, either individually or in

conjunction with the Director, is further wrongful because it
exceeds their statutory authority under Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-17-8,
23-14-18(4) and 23-14-8, which vest authority for establishing
wildlife conservation rules in the Wildlife Board and limit
administrative and law enforcement personnel of the Division of
Wildlife Resources to execution of the policies of the Wildlife
Board, and under resolutions of the Wildlife Board repealing
former proclamations limiting dog training and dog trials during
the nesting season, thereby permitting dog trials in the State of
Utah at any time, including during the nesting season, other than
in designated wildlife preserves.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)
32.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

33.

The conduct of Gurley alleged constitutes conversion of

31.

property belonging to Plaintiff.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Tortious Interference with Contract Rights)
34.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

35.

The conduct of Gurley alleged constitutes the tortious

31.

interference with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of
Utah under said Lease No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No.
PWF-SLO-129.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Defamation)
36.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

37.

The conduct of Gurley alleged has injured the character

31.

and reputation of Plaintiff, including Plaintiff's character and
reputation in the practice of law, and with the Division of Wildlife Resources, public prosecutors and the office of the Attorney
General, State of Utah, and amounts to slander and/or libel of
Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as
follows:
A.

Enjoining Defendant, or any persons acting as agents of

Defendant or in concert or participation with Defendant, from
interfering, directly or indirectly, with Plaintiff's rights under
his lease with the State of Utah or the rights of Plaintiff or
Plaintiff's partners and affiliates under their certificate of
registration with the Wildlife Resources Division, and further
enjoining Defendant from taking any action against Plaintiff, or
dog training groups of which Plaintiff is a member or which
Plaintiff is affiliated with, directly or indirectly, with respect
to dog training and/or dog trials.
B.

For money damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for

destruction of Plaintiff's bird pens and related facilities;
C.

For money damages in the amount of $10,000.00 for

interference with Plaintiff's contract rights;
D.

For money damages in the amount of $50,000.00 for damages
12

i.-v

r \

•• /•** /"k.

to Plaintiff's character and reputation;
E.

For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount

for attorneys7 fees; and
F.

For such further and additional relief as the Court

determines proper.
DATED t h i s / ^ ^ day of August, 1991.

/Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this / ^ ^ d a y of August, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. John P. Soltis, Assistant
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,J Salt Lake City, UT 84114.
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